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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a general equilibrium model to analyze the influence that a contaminating 
sector has on a natural system’s capacity of resilience, the provision of a public utility service 
and social welfare, in which the level and capacity to respond to resilience are uncertain, so 
a probability distribution for the growing loss of resilience with pollution going from a 
prudent state to an imprudent is defined. And examines first the incidence of expected 
Pigouvian taxes and finds that these taxes are not enough to maintain resilience because of 
the cumulative effect of pollution and also that society prefers a prudent tax. Furthermore, 
the transaction of Permits for Environmental Services (PES) between sector that provides the 
public utility service and the contaminating sector is allowed. This shows a redistribution of 
resources very much in favor of the contaminating sector, and there are no incentives to invest 
in these payments unless the affected have additional objectives for the maximization of 
private benefit. 
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Alcance de los impuestos Pigouvianos esperados y los pagos por servicios ambientales 
en un modelo de equilibrio general con una restricción de capital natural 
 
Resumen 
 
Este documento presenta un modelo de equilibrio general para analizar la influencia que un 
sector contaminante tiene sobre la capacidad de resiliencia de un sistema natural, la provisión 
de un servicio de utilidad pública y el bienestar social, dado que el nivel y la capacidad de 
respuesta a la resiliencia son inciertos. Se define una distribución de probabilidad para la 
creciente pérdida de resiliencia con la contaminación que pasa de un estado prudente a un 
imprudente. Y examina primero la incidencia de los impuestos pigouvianos esperados y 
muestra que estos impuestos no son suficientes para mantener la resiliencia debido al efecto 
acumulativo de la contaminación y también que la sociedad prefiere un impuesto prudente. 
Además, se permite la transacción de Permisos para Servicios Ambientales (PSA) entre el 
sector que presta un servicio público y el sector contaminante. Esto muestra una 
redistribución de los recursos muy a favor del sector contaminante y que no hay incentivos 
para invertir en estos pagos a menos que los afectados por la contaminación tengan objetivos 
adicionales a la maximización del beneficio privado. 
 
Palabras clave: Contaminación ambiental, incertidumbre, resiliencia, modelo de equilibrio 
general, impuestos pigouvianos, pagos por servicios ambientales 
 
Clasificación JEL: D58, H21, Q56 
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Introduction 
 
The effects of the extraction and the degradation of resources which reduce the capacity of 
regeneration of natural systems and the cost of opportunity produced when economic activity 
is regulated, have generated a growing concern in knowing how important it is to establish 
restrictions on production. Thus, concepts like irreversible environmental change, 
temperature increase and variability reach levels, which may risk the survival, the extinction 
of mass species and a potential drop of economic activity play an important role in 
understanding this trade-off.  
 
Pindyck (2013) discusses if society is willing to accept stricter environmental policies in pro 
of reducing contamination even if they have a negative impact on the economy based on the 
construction of probability distributions for the most probable medium term and long-term 
temperature changes, or in economic activity as a consequence of these temperature changes 
(see also Pindyck, 2015). He founds that even if and optimal policy depended on a great 
dislike of risk and on an intertemporal preference rate, at the beginning, there are no strong 
incentives for sectors to reduce considerably their economic activity. 
 
To study the relation between natural systems and economic activity is important because in 
the last few years the development of technology and the massification of production have 
generated changes in environmental conditions and the planet's natural resources in general 
(IPCC, 2007). For instance, Urban (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on studies, which show 
to what extent climate change threatens different groups of species. Urban also found that in 
addition to the fact that many species have a higher risk of disappearing, there is an implicit 
risk for some groups of species, which will have to change their development habits. 
Furthermore, this study maps this risk worldwide finding that in zones like South America 
risk can reach 25%5.  
 
Resilience is a way of addressing the characteristics of natural systems and their capacity to 
respond when facing their degradation and pollution. One way to understand resilience is the  
nature's persistence and capacity to absorb shocks and changes and to allow the supply of 
goods and services essential for economic functioning (Holling, 1973; Tobón, et al, 2015). 
Nevertheless, one of the problems of addressing this characteristic is the difficulty to measure 
and quantify its level and its capacity to respond to its affectation. Regarding this matter, the 
climatic change synthesis report (IPCC, 2007) indicates that the expectation regarding the 
levels of climatic change is quite uncertain because of the great interrelation existing in the 
planet's physical and chemical conditions. An argument in this same line of thought can be 
found in Pindyck (2013) who used a gamma distribution on different alternatives of 
temperature distribution because for his objectives, this distribution presents tails with high 
levels of probability, and this implies that it takes into account which are the most admissible 
critical levels of changes.  
 
                                                 
5 See Morueta-Holme et al (2005) for historical evidence on the incidence of temperature changes on 
ecosystems and conflictive displacement of species and economic activities. 
 
Borradores Departamento de Economía no. 59 
 
 
4 
 
 
The literature that studies the effects of exogenous shocks on a system frequently 
incorporates uncertainty to account for the impossibility of determining the true effect that 
said shock would have. This intends to recognize that in the natural system researchers do 
not exactly know the point of no return or the step towards another stationary state of a less 
biodiverse system. Weitzman (2009) shows that it is fundamental to understand the effects 
of uncertainty when studying relations between natural and economic phenomena because 
these effects can be even more representative than intertemporal-related effects6.  
 
Maintaining the idea of representing resilience endogenously to a system in accordance with 
Tobón et al (2015), the critical point of a function which represents a natural system’s 
capacity of resilience —the function's concavity change— reflects the point of no return. 
Researchers could model uncertainty maintaining the trend of the function and making a 
random displacement so that the level of resilience and the critical point vary because of the 
production of a representative contaminating sector. Unlike authors as Baumgärtner and 
Strunz (2009) who point out that resilience directly affects the probability of remaining in a 
determinate state, this paper evaluates the complete transmission channel when there is a 
shock in such a way that resilience affects the level of a natural system and the level of the 
activity of the representative contaminating sector, and it affects resilience. Furthermore, this 
increases the probability of being at a more critical level as this sector's production increases. 
Baumgärtner and Strunz (2009) use a discrete distribution in accordance with a two-state 
scenario, and unlike them, this study utilizes a continuous distribution to capture the 
multiplicity of states observed in the practice agreeing with its asymmetric nature, which it 
must present aiming at approaching the characteristics of a natural system.  
 
In addition, from a comprehensive perspective, researchers must address the interaction of a 
natural system with an economic system and the different consequences on economic 
production including a loss of resilience, affectations on the sector that provides a public 
utility service, the value of economic production and social welfare. To do so, it is useful to 
implement general equilibrium models, which account for this interaction and the total effects 
of environmental regulations.  
 
This study incorporates a general equilibrium model (GEM) with two representative 
economic sectors, a representative consumer and a natural system as a supplier for the 
economy in a two-period life cycle. Property rights on a natural system are quite well defined 
and used to provide a public utility service regulated by price system, so it is fundamental to 
try to maintain a natural system’s capacity of resilience. Furthermore, there is uncertainty 
regarding the effects of pollution on this capacity of resilience, and on the effectiveness of 
the economic instruments, which regulate environmental externalities. Thus, the main 
objective is to understand the problem of regulating under uncertainty about loss of resilience 
in a dynamic scenario.  
 
Based on the economic context, an optimal tax policy in a world of uncertainty depends on 
the knowledge that planers have of the distribution of stochastic variables. Furthermore, in a 
                                                 
6 A good summary on how research has analyzed climatic change based on the economic perspective is found 
in Stern (2008). 
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dynamic environment, agents adjust the knowledge they have from period to period to make 
this decision (Dyrda and Pedroni, 2013; Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski, 2001; Laczó, 
Marcet and Greulich, 2015). Nevertheless, to understand the characteristics of natural 
systems and establish suitable policies, it is also necessary to bear in mind that natural 
systems also have cumulative factors, which could affect the optimal decisions a planner 
makes (GGRR, 2012). This study shows that the optimal tax resulting from decision making 
in accordance with the expected value of the effects is not necessarily sufficient to maintain 
the capacity of resilience because of the cumulative effect of pollution. This suggests that is 
necessary to be prudent when implementing environmental policies. This research also 
studies the effectiveness of payments for Environmental Services (PES) as a private initiative 
of the public utility service producing sector N which intends to invest in this protection so 
that sector X can reduce its level of activity and its emissions aiming to generate an 
environmental benefit and to guarantee to the sector N profits in the future7. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section I presents the literature review 
of the framework of this study. Section II proposes the GEM, its scenarios and the results of 
the various simulations. Finally, the last section highlights main conclusions, constraints and 
suggested research lines. 
 
 
I. Modeling of a Natural System in an Economic Context 
 
Economic literature has wisely pointed out that natural systems have important differences 
compared to other systems, which must be consider (see Peterson, 2000; Mitchell, 2012; 
Admiraal, 2013). Peterson (2000) highlights the differences with economic systems where 
besides admitting a level of simplification, it is possible to assume rigorously an analysis of 
the partial balance of their properties. They differ from natural systems where they also admit 
certain simplification. However, natural systems are highly interconnected, and it is not so 
easy to conduct an independent analysis of those characteristics. 
 
Specifically, when talking about those characteristics, ecological literature has defined a 
variety of concepts aiming at identifying said characteristics including biodiversity, threat, 
vulnerability, risk, stability, persistence and ecological thresholds (n, 2006; Stokols, 2013). 
Largely, they are contained in the concept of resilience. For instance, resilience is inversely 
proportional to a degree of threat, i.e. the frequency with which endogenous and exogenous 
affectations attack an ecosystem. In accordance with Brand (2009), resilience is also related 
to vulnerability, or the natural susceptibility and capacity to deal with disruptions. 
Susceptibility reflects a natural system’s potential to have something affect it while resilience 
and resistance are determinant in the stability of a natural system facing a disruption.   
 
The concept of resilience has had great acceptance by different disciplines, and they have 
used it specially to explain the capacity that a determinate system has to recover its capacity 
                                                 
7 For a literature review on PES, see Taconni (2012), who argues various ways of approaching this concept 
and implementation problems.   
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to respond when facing a disruption8. Furthermore, when speaking about resilience special 
interactions are important because receivers can change resulting from modifications in the 
areas that surround the ecosystem including human actions (Groffman, 2006) 9.   
 
The difference between the modeling of an economic system and the modeling of a natural 
system is precisely in the inclusion of these characteristics. In Willis (2015), there is an 
interesting characterization of the properties of these systems and their relation with 
endogenous phenomena as for instance climatic change and its effects. However, that study 
ignores economic systems. Weitzman (2009) studies the economic impact that different 
catastrophic events can have using a statistic model showing that the omission of natural 
characteristics in economic systems and the omission of dynamics tend to underestimate the 
effects that climatic aspects like global warming can have. Galaz, et al (2016) study how 
abrupt shifts in ecological systems —cascading ecological crises— that are characterized by: 
complex causality, nonlinear change, recombination potential and cascading dynamics, 
propagate into societal crises and propose the most challenging institutional and political 
facts needed to take into account to deal with this double problem. 
 
Regarding the simultaneous analysis of economic and natural systems, one of the most 
implemented strategies has been General Equilibrium Models, for they permit the capture of 
simultaneous relations between one and the other. This models have been used to introduce 
natural systems from different scenarios and specifically the concept of resilience10. Among 
many others, they have worked the extent of economic incentives and the use of abatement 
technologies to eradicate pollution to regulate the resilience of natural systems (Tobón et al, 
2015). Or the relation between the resilience and the sustainability of ecological and 
economical systems (Derissen, 2011), the management of food and the effect it has on their 
resilience of production systems (Naylor, 2008), and the effect of resilience on attempts of 
exogenous disruption of a natural service like natural disasters (Rose and Liao, 2005). 
 
Static models have generally studied the understanding of a natural system and the property 
of resilience (Peterson, 2003) 11. Nevertheless, if studies define resilience as the persistence 
or capacity to absorb temporary changes or shocks maintaining the same relation between 
the populations and functions of a system, so that they may permit the provision of 
environmental goods and services (Holling, 1973), the idea of resilience is framed in a 
dynamic context. This is precisely because it consists of a recovery response in time facing 
                                                 
8 See Mitchel (2002) for a discussion on how the concept of resilience is applied in the different fields of 
knowledge and Walker et al. (2004) for a characterization of resilience and related attributes of social– 
ecological systems. 
9 As a matter of fact, Prior and Hagmann (2014) examine the methodological challenges of the 
operationalization of resilience and propose pertinent considerations in the construction of resilience indices. 
10 For a discussion on the importance of this concept and the role providing environmental asses and services, 
see Holling (1973) and Groffman (2006). 
11 Nevertheless, this has not been the only strategy. Perrings and Stern (2000) study of the relation between the 
loss of the capacity to recover in an ecological and economic system, and its long-term productive potential. 
They do so using any econometric approach (application of Kalman's filter) to model the loss of resilience in 
agricultural ecosystems (semi-arid pastures in Botswana), and they find that unlike the common knowledge, 
the sensitivity of this system to exogenous disruptions is only frailly affected by variations in maintenance costs. 
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an effect that can be persistent and cumulative (See Derissen, 2011; Dawson, 2010; Peterson, 
2003). 
 
Understanding the dynamics of a phenomenon allows the recovery of other important 
characteristics like the cumulative effects of pollution, uncertainty, risk aversion and a 
discount factor among others in the response of a natural system or agents’ behavior which 
would not be very relevant in a static scenario (Perz, 2013; Brozović, 2007; Bhatt, 2005).   
 
For example, Peterson et al (2003) simulate a dynamic model with uncertainty to understand 
how resilience affects the probability of transition of a lake between two ecological states. 
They include a eutrophic (or productive) state which is a habitat with an abundance of 
nutrients and organic matter formation through photosynthesis which stimulates the 
excessive growth of algae whose death and decomposition increases the biochemical demand 
of oxygen, for excessive growth of algae can exhaust oxygen and result in the death of the 
fish population. The other state is an oligotrophic (or non-productive) state characterized by 
low production of algae and a habitat suitable for species resulting from low nutrients which 
equals calculating a potential index of the maximum capacity that the lake has to support a 
required disruption without displacing the initial state. 
 
On the other hand, Brady and Cong (2011) analyze the loss of welfare that occurs when an 
exogenous shock alters the biodiversity of the ground in agriculture as a proportional function 
while the system takes time to return to the starting point after a disruption. This potential 
loss is inversely proportional to the system’s level of resilience. They use a dynamic GEM 
on stochastic disruptions, which simulate shocks and take into account uncertainty and the 
agents' potential risk aversion of exogenous shocks. Authors point out the importance of 
diversity to sustain the rate of ecosystem services despite environmental fluctuations, which 
studies characterized as a portfolio that mitigates the influence of uncertainty on welfare and 
provides insurance against future environmental changes.  
 
Likewise, Baumgärtner y Strunz (2009, 2011), Mäler, and Li (2010) analyze the importance 
of resilience in natural systems, concluding that economic studies see this property as an 
insurance against uncertainty. These systems are subject to states of nature having different 
convenience for individuals and the mechanism of mitigation of uncertainty 
that may develop will depend on individual’s risk aversion. For instance, Baumgärtner and 
Strunz (2009) present a model with two states of nature to provide environmental goods and 
services, high and low (yH, yL) with 𝑝 and 1 − 𝑝 probabilities respectively, and the degree of 
resilience (R) determines the probability of having the system stay in one state or the other. 
Moreover, based on this concept, they construct an income lottery {𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻; 𝑝(𝑹), (1 −
𝑝(𝑹))}. In this case, uncertainty reflects agents' lack of knowledge regarding the final income 
level. Mäler and Li (2010) represent a GEM to show that ecosystem risks depend on how 
resilience evolves in time making evident the importance of adopting dynamic models. 
 
Pindyck (2013) wonders if policies to reduce pollution are cost-effective. He compared the 
potential reduction that the GDP would have with the application of severe policies to reduce 
pollution and agents' willingness to pay for a healthier future environment. He proposes in 
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particular a statistical distribution for climatic change, which permits incorporating 
uncertainty using a parametrized gamma distribution so that extreme climatic events have 
high occurrence probabilities unlike when using short tail distributions. In this scenario, he 
finds that to avoid moderate temperature increases (like 4%), it would be necessary to reduce 
economic activity at least 6% of the GDP. Despite this, willingness to pay for a contamination 
reduction policy would be small for most of the reasonable values of the discount factor and 
risk aversion of individuals. As seen below, this research has a close relation with Pindyck 
because it analyzes the well-being of different environmental policies aiming to regulate 
pollution levels 12 
 
On the other hand, Urban (2015) analyzes the effects of climate change on the natural 
ecosystem emphasizing the risk of the extinction of the species. The author finds that under 
the current path of production the temperature on Earth would increase in an amount close to 
4.3°C and this would increase in 7.9% the risk of Extinction of species13.   
 
This paper has framed on the context of the discussed literature. First, it tries to understand 
as does in Pindyck (2013) the effect that environmental change can have on economic activity 
and in this case a polluting sector X represents it. Second, the effect it has on a natural 
capital´s  property of resilience just like in Urban (2015), and then in the production of a 
public utility service. However, unlike them, this research studies these characteristics on a 
GEM that allows the comprehension of interrelations occurring between economic sectors 
and includes dynamic environmental effects (accumulation of pollution). Furthermore, this 
study shows how based on an environment of uncertainty about capacity of resilience, both 
Pigouvian taxes and payment for Environmental Services performance to control this 
capacity, and global effects on social welfare are measured. 
 
Literature understands environmental Services through different approaches, which range 
from environmental economy to ecological economy. In other words, they range from paying 
for the cost of opportunity of whoever offers up to a symbolic value in which society 
considers the service a social contribution of whoever can supply it (Taconni, 2012). 
Nevertheless, this study has the idea that the contaminating sector (X) indirectly provides an 
environmental service because it favors the present and future level of the natural capital 
reducing its economic activity. Therefore, the sector that provides a public utility service 
                                                 
12 Unlike Pyndick (2013), Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2011) discussed the possibility of establishing a 
distribution to model climatic change because of the little knowledge researchers have, and find that that 
investing in optimal damage control is growing in the degree of uncertainty. In addition, when the cost of 
abatement technology is low, investment and mitigation can act as substitutes. In Pindyck (2016), “the damage 
functions that translate higher temperature into reductions in GDP are ad hoc with little or no theoretical or 
empirical grounding”, and that “we know very little about the likely economic impact of large (or even 
moderate) temperature increases that occur gradually, over many years”, this is why the author prefers the 
opinion of experts regarding “1) the probabilities of alternative economic outcomes of climate change, and in 
particular catastrophic outcomes, but not the particular causes of those outcomes and 2) the reduction in 
emissions that would be required to avoid or limit those potential outcomes”. Even this study adopts functional 
forms concerning the modeling of the probability of the affectation, which are particular cases like the ones 
Pindyck (2013) presented. 
13 The author also finds effects differentiated for different regions in the world. The most vulnerable region 
would be South America and the least vulnerable would be Europe, North America and Central America. 
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using a natural capital would have incentives to invest in the service. This approach is based 
on Coase's (1960) idea in which the path to recover efficiency after assigning property rights 
is indifferent for whomever they have assigned. 
 
 
II. The model  
 
Suppose a GEM) with three sectors X, Y, N, and the representative consumer. N represents 
the provision of a public utility service that uses a natural capital A. The study bases its 
technologies and preferences on: 
 
𝑋 = 𝐻𝑁𝑥
𝛿𝑌𝑥
𝜀 ,   𝑌 = 𝑀𝑁𝑦
𝜋𝑋𝑦
𝜗 ,   𝑈 = 𝑋𝑐
𝛼𝑌𝑐
𝜃𝑁𝑐
1−𝛼−𝜃  (1) 
 
Each 𝑖𝑗 represents input 𝑖 for the production of a good 𝑗. Aiming to model N, the study 
proposes a functional form considering a starting stock of A, a marginal contribution of 
human resources (𝑌𝑁) aimed at transforming A in the public utility service N, and a 
component that represents the capacity of resilience 𝑓(𝜔 𝑋). In other words, it refers to a 
change from a stationary productive state to a very low productive or non-resilient state 
resulting from pollution associated to production X in which 𝜔 is a parameter of 
proportionality. 
𝑁 = 𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
𝑓(𝜔 𝑋)  (2) 
 
This function indicates a critical point (cp) in which it changes concavity (it passes from 
convex to concave). This reflects that N has a capacity to support up to one level of 
externality, and after that it is not possible to recover (Tobón, Molina and Vasco, 2015), so:  
 
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑋
< 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑    
𝑑2𝑁
𝑑𝑋2
> 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 𝑐𝑝,    
𝑑2𝑁
𝑑𝑋2
< 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 > 𝑐𝑝,
𝑑2𝑁
𝑑𝑋2
= 0  𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 = 𝑐𝑝  
 
An equation that fulfills these properties is:   
 
𝑁 = 𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
 [𝑎(𝜔 𝑋)3 + 𝑏(𝜔 𝑋)2 + 𝑐(𝜔𝑋) + 1 + 𝑜(𝜔𝑋)] (3) 
 
in which 𝜓 is close to zero, to indicate that the productivity of the resources used to produce 
N or to reverse the loss of resilience is very low, and the function 𝑜(𝜔𝑋) indicates deviations 
regarding the trend to account for the fact that a response in the production of the public 
utility service is not homogeneous on the different pollution levels. 
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1. Market Equilibrium 
 
Each sector resolves the following profit maximization problems: 
 
Contaminating sector X: 
Max 𝐵𝑋 = 𝑃𝑋𝑋 − 𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑥 − 𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑥    s.t.  𝑋 = 𝐻𝑁𝑥
𝛿𝑌𝑥
𝜀  (4) 
Clean sector Y: 
Max 𝐵𝑌 = 𝑃𝑌𝑌 − 𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑦 − 𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑦    s.t.  𝑌 = 𝑀𝑁𝑦
𝜋𝑋𝑦
𝜃 (5) 
Sector N:  
Max 𝐵𝑁 = 𝑃𝑁𝑁 − 𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑁    s.t.   𝑁 = 𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
𝑓(𝜔 𝑋) (6) 
 
Finally, representative consumer maximizes her utility subject to a budget restriction given 
by sectorial profits. 
 
Max 𝑈 = 𝑋𝑐
𝛼𝑌𝑐
𝜃𝑁𝑐
1−𝛼−𝜃   s.t.   𝑅 = 𝐵𝑋 + 𝐵𝑌 + 𝐵𝑁 = 𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑐 + 𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑐 + 𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑐 (7) 
 
As a result, the model obtains the optimal demands of inputs, products and consumption 
levels. Equilibrium occurs when there are (𝑃𝑥 , 𝑃𝑛) prices which make all the decisions 
compatible in the sense that the supply equals the demand in each market:  
 
𝑋 = 𝑋𝑐 + 𝑋𝑦,             𝑁 = 𝑁𝑐 + 𝑁𝑥 + 𝑁𝑦 (8) 
 
In which 𝑃𝑦 = 1 and market 𝑌 must also be in equilibrium using Walras law. Observes that 
though the N sector will be affected by the cumulative effect of pollution it is assumed that 
she and everyone else must be very short-sighted, because the future does not matter for 
them. 
 
 
2. Uncertainty in the Model 
Introducing uncertainty means recognizing that in a natural system is not exactly known its 
starting capacity and its point of no return. Maintaining the idea of the critical point of a cubic 
function as the point of no return, uncertainty can be modeled preserving the body of the 
function and displacing it so that the critical point varies. In equations (3) and (4) 𝑓(. ) denotes 
the envelope function of trajectory oscillations that accounts the resilience property of a 
natural system and it is characterized by representing a critical point (𝜔𝑋𝑐𝑝), which reflects 
the fact that the production of N is not sustainable beyond a certain level of externality. 
𝑓(𝜔 𝑋)  changes concavity based on 𝑋𝑐𝑝 = −
𝑏
3𝑎
, defining that 𝑎 < 0 and 𝑏 > 0.  In addition, 
it makes a translation of function r units on the left 𝑁′ = 𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
𝑓(𝜔 𝑋 + 𝑟). 
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Graph 1. Effects of uncertainty of the capacity of resilience of a natural system in the production of a N 
 
 
Now the critical point is 𝑋𝑐𝑝 = −
𝑏
3𝑎
− 𝑟, in other words that the loss of resilience increases 
linearly. When there is a lack of knowledge regarding the recovery of the true capacity for 
natural capital, it is assumed that there is a point of no return. However, it is not known 
precisely the level of pollution that pushes the capacity to its limits. Therefore, this paper 
supposes that the functional form is based on a prudent scenario (𝑁𝑝) and on an imprudent 
scenario (𝑁𝐼) associated to borders that contain the true functional form of N. Therefore, the 
expected value of N will be: 
 
𝐸(𝑁) = 𝑝𝑁𝐼 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑁𝑃𝑟  (10) 
 
In which 𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑃𝑟 represent beliefs (imprudent and prudent) regarding the true level of N. 
The belief of a high level of the natural system is imprudent and the possibility of it being 
low is prudent. A functional form for 𝐸(𝑁) would be: 
 
𝐸(𝑁) = 𝑝 𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
𝑓(𝑤 𝑋) + (1 − 𝑝)𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜓
𝑓(𝑤 𝑋 + 𝑟)     (11) 
With 𝑟 > 0.  
 
A constant probability is not necessarily reasonable because it could suggest that expectations 
do not change with the level of externality. Nevertheless, it can be a useful form to represent 
the economic system because it allows the interpretation of how equilibrium levels change 
when the probability of having a high or low level of N varies. 
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Based on this functional form  𝐸(𝑁) has the same form as 𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑃𝑟 and it is far away from 
one and the other in a constant 𝑝 ratio so that high 𝑝 values (close to 1) make the function 
quite similar to 𝑁𝐼 while low 𝑝 values (close to 0) make this function close to 𝑁𝑃𝑟. Therefore, 
it is possible to vary parameter 𝑝 and analyze what happens with these variations on the 
equilibrium assignments of the economy understanding the probability of the system collapse 
as a growing function of the damage level. The more affected and threatened a system is, the 
greater its degree of uncertainty will be and the higher the risks of unrepairable affections. 
One way of modeling this idea, is to establish the probability as a function of the level of 
externality: 
𝑝 = 𝑒−𝜔 𝑋 (13) 
 
This function shows that if there are increases in the level of affectation 𝜔 𝑋 generates more 
uncertainty toward the State of low resilience 𝑁𝑃𝑟.
14 Notice that if 𝑋 = 0 there is no 
externality. Therefore,  𝑝 = 1 and 1 − 𝑝 = 0, leads to generating certainty regarding the level 
of N, for there would be no risk of a collapse due to the absence of a threat and 𝐸(𝑁) = 𝑁𝐼. 
Furthermore, when X increases, the function converges rapidly to 𝑁𝑃𝑟 because of the 
exponential growth of the probability.   
 
In view of the previous framework, this study will introduce below Pigouvian taxes and 
payment for Environmental Services (PES). In each case, the general market equilibrium and 
the planned assignment of efficiency in two periods are solved, and their comparison allows 
planners to obtain a route to regulate the market.  
 
 
3. Pigouvian Taxes in a general equilibrium model  
 
The estimate of what the tax sector X must pay based on the assignment of efficiency is equal 
to the marginal damage value (see the Appendix), so: 
 
𝑡 =
𝐴𝑌𝑁
𝜎+1 𝑑𝑓
𝑑 𝑤𝑋
 
𝜎 𝑁
𝑃𝑌   (15) 
 
The new market equilibrium X will then resolve:  
 
Max 𝐵𝑋 = 𝑃𝑋𝑋 − 𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑥 − 𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑥 − 𝑡 𝜔 𝑋     s.t.  𝑋 = 𝐻𝑁𝑥
𝛿𝑌𝑥
𝜀 (16) 
 
This generates a tax collection of a 𝜏 = 𝑡 𝜔 𝑋 magnitude which is redistributed to the 
consumers through a lump sum income. The consumer's problem is then:   
 
Max 𝑈 = 𝑋𝑐
𝛼𝑌𝑐
𝜃𝑁𝑐
1−𝛼−𝜃  s.t. 𝑅 = 𝐵𝑋 + 𝐵𝑌 + 𝐵𝑁 + 𝜏 = 𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑐 + 𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑐 + 𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑐        (17) 
 
                                                 
14 Note that this probability function can be understood as a particular case of a Gamma distribution (See 
Pindyck, 2013, 2015). 
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4. Payment of Environmental Services (PES) 
 
PES can be defined in favor of any of the parties of the market, so from here on, this paper 
assumes that whoever provides a public utility service and uses a natural capital as an input 
has incentives to invest in an environmental service offered by the contaminating sector (X) 
(Taconni, 2012). This equals producing and contaminating less because there is a risk that 
there is no availability of a natural capital for the following period. To have the contaminating 
sector go from producing 𝑋  to 𝑋(1 − ∆), the demand of 𝑁𝑥 and 𝑌𝑥 must be reduced as 
follows:    
𝑁𝑥(𝑗+1) = 𝑁𝑥𝑗(1 − ∆)
1
𝜀+𝛿,   𝑌𝑥(𝑗+1) = 𝑌𝑥𝑗(1 − ∆)
1
𝜀+𝛿 (20) 
 
and with these demands X’s production will be: 
 
𝑋𝑗+1 = 𝐻[𝑌𝑥𝑗(1 − ∆)
1
𝜀+𝛿]𝜀[𝑁𝑥𝑗(1 − ∆)
1
𝜀+𝛿]𝛿 = 𝑋𝑗(1 − ∆)  (21) 
 
Sector N will pay based on the price of X in the j period because whoever sells it will only  
if the retribution it gets generates the same profits that it had the previous period. Therefore, 
sector N will pay in such a way that X will receive what it is not earning by not producing 
∆𝑋𝑗, so its new profits are: 
𝐵𝑛𝑗 = (1 − 𝜓)𝑃𝑛𝑗𝑁 − 𝑃𝑥𝑗 
∆𝑋𝑗+1
1−∆
 (22) 
 
The expression 𝑃𝑥𝑗
∆𝑋𝑗+1
1−∆
  guarantees that N pays exactly for the proportion of X that it is not 
produced, bearing in mind that producer X supposes that the price 𝑃𝑥 is not going to vary
15:  
 
𝑃𝑥𝑗𝑋𝑗+1 + 𝑃𝑥𝑗 
∆𝑋𝑗+1
1−∆
 =  𝑃𝑥𝑗𝑋𝑗(1 − ∆) + 𝑃𝑥𝑗 
∆𝑋𝑗(1−∆)
1−∆
 =  𝑃𝑥𝑗𝑋𝑗 (23) 
 
Therefore, this payment corresponds to what X would not earn for producing less. 
 
 
III. Main results 
 
The first thing to perceive is the effect of externalities on the capacity of resilience of the 
natural capital, which will affect the productivity of the public service. The vertical axis of 
graph 2 represents the level of N for an accumulated pollution level in t=1,2, and the 
horizontal axis indicates 𝜔𝑋 contamination, in which 𝜔 is between 10% and 70%. The 
highest curve (green) shows an imprudent scenario and the lowest (red) shows a prudent 
scenario. The Intermediate curve (black) indicates the expected value of N regarding these 
                                                 
15 Since this is about a general equilibrium model in which prices and assignments are endogenous, this study 
cannot determine a PES which guarantees X income or profit equal to the ones it obtained without a service, so 
that sector N pay X exactly the cost of opportunity it incurred in when it reduced its production. Then, if for N 
the benefit of paying for this service is uncertain, it will also be for X.  
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two states. Finally, the dotted line (red) shows the critical level of resilience. The equilibria 
points show that without externalities in the first period, N begins from the assumed starting 
capital, and it produces just a bit because of the effect of deterioration between each period. 
Nevertheless, when there are externalities, it falls to a very low level in t=1 and the effect in 
t=2 is much higher. 
 
Graph 2. Incidence of externality on the capacity of resilience of a natural system and the production of 
a public service N 
 
  
 
 
Second, this study compares the results of the regulation per incentives and PSE over N, the 
public service and social welfare. The regulation contrasts different Pigovian taxes including 
an imprudent tax (𝑡) which supposes that there is a better scenario regarding N, and a prudent 
tax (𝑡), which supposes the worst scenario. In addition, it contrasts an expected tax ( 𝑡∗), 
which is a charge equal to the expected value for 𝑡 y 𝑡 and a resilient tax, which charges in 
t=1 the value of the marginal damage and in t=2 a tax which records the cumulative effect of 
pollution and permits maintaining resilience. On the other hand, PES is a private initiative. 
Sector N negotiate PES at the cost of opportunity to reduce the production of who sells an 
asset X, and apply the guideline of maintaining a level of public service equal to the one 
reached applying both expected tax 𝑡∗ and the resilient tax. The study measures under which 
circumstances the effects on public service and welfare are greater than a world with 
externalities.  
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If planners regulate X charging it 𝑡∗, N maintains resilience but just in t = 1 (eq. With 
Externalities and 𝑡1
∗), since it generates a cumulative effect of pollution in time which is not 
taken into account in the calculation of the tax (eq. With Externalities and 𝑡2
∗) (Graph 3). 
Moreover, Px increases ostensibly to support the tax so that X produces a lesser amount and 
the expectation is that social welfare should increase.  
 
 
Graph 3. Incidence of expected Taxes on N's capacity of resilience  
  
 
Now, what happens in the period after a mistaken evaluation of Pigovian taxes if planners 
charge 𝑡 or 𝑡 is exposed. In an optimal scenario ( 𝑡∗), Px increases ostensibly each period and 
between the two periods it rises up to an 18% average resulting from both the lack of X when 
it is regulated and the transfer of part of the tax to consumers. However, taxes begin to 
decrease as a percentage of the price Px as the percentage of pollution increases while N 
drops to almost a 30% result of the accumulation of pollution in the two periods. 
 
When the Environmental Policy is based on this 𝑡∗, the amount of N will be between the 
values obtained on prudent and imprudent policies being closer to prudent policies. 
Nevertheless, in t=2 using a prudent tax (𝑡2) or an expected tax (𝑡2
∗) does not maintain 
resilience. Then, an even higher tax than the prudent tax to maintain this capacity must be set 
in t=2 (graph 4).  
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Graph 4. Incidence of the different taxes on N's capacity of resilience  
 
 
Table 1 shows the accumulated levels of the public service in t=1,2 while putting different 
taxes and finding that these levels are higher in prudent taxes (𝑡2). Therefore, if policy makers 
use these criteria as a foundation for an environmental policy, prudent taxes would be 
preferable. 
 
 Table 1. Accumulated effects of different taxes on a public service 
  Type 
  No 
Externalities 
Externalities Expected Prudent Imprudent Resilient 
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
 
0.1 50.920 28.8003 32.521 34.050 31.678 31.871 
0.2 50.920 20.99115 26.408 28.093 24.918 27.428 
0.3 50.920 16.23548 23.903 25.602 21.487 26.247 
0.4 50.920 12.888883 23.258 25.122 19.873 25.843 
0.5 50.920 10.45713 23.621 25.827 19.395 25.916 
0.6 50.920 8.66581 24.536 27.174 20.172 26.258 
0.7 50.920 7.321114 25.746 28.825 20.428 26.782 
Note: Results do not change with lower discount rates. 
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In addition, when measuring the cumulative percentage of increase of the supply of the public 
service when regulating sector X in t=1,2 raises are very high with different taxes, and even 
more, if one applies a prudent environmental policy (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Cumulative percentage of the effect of different taxes on a public service 
 Type 
  Externalities Expected Prudent Imprudent Resilient 
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
 
0.1 -          86.13             
26.308  
          
37.364  
         
20.486  
          
21.332  
0.2 -       117.606             
56.097  
          
73.693  
         
40.858  
          
68.301  
0.3 -       136.299           
115.290  
        
139.310  
         
78.364  
       
158.382  
0.4 -       149.451           
228.781  
        
264.374  
       
150.642  
       
302.968  
0.5 -       159.004           
429.417  
        
489.403  
       
281.668  
       
533.362  
0.6 -       166.037           
765.653  
        
873.512  
       
515.991  
       
888.500  
0.7 -       171.315       
1,304.625  
    
1,497.715  
       
887.481  
    
1.419.278  
Note: The first Column compares equilibrium market with externalities and without externalities 
 
 
Next, when considering the effects on cumulative social welfare also is found that values are 
higher when charging prudent taxes, even if the differences are much smaller in comparison 
with the effects of other taxes (Table 3). In addition, when analyzing these changes in terms 
of percentage, cumulative earnings in social welfare validate a prudent regulation, which 
could have a sum that goes from 1.4% up to 18% depending on the percentage of pollution. 
The study also finds that the difference with expected taxes 𝑡∗ is very small and that even if 
under resilient taxes there is a considerable increase in the provision of public services, and 
there is also a 1.54% decrease in welfare. Therefore, weighing welfare and capacity of 
resilience and foreseeing possible prediction errors when measuring the amount and the 
response of a natural system and its capacity of resilience, the regulation should be the one 
that gives priority to resilience.  
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Table 3. Cumulative effect of different taxes on social welfare  
  Type 
  No 
Externalities 
Externalitie
s 
Expected Pruden
t 
Impruden
t 
Resilien
t 
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
 
0.1 2.881    2.75266 2.77153 2.772 2.768 2.769 
0.2 2.881    2.68147 2.71706 2.720 2.711 2.712 
0.3 2.881    2.62067 2.68042 2.686 2.672 2.656 
0.4 2.881    2.56204 2.65357 2.660 2.645 2.619 
0.5 2.881    2.50479 2.63248 2.639 2.626 2.599 
0.6 2.881    2.44979 2.61481 2.620 2.612 2.590 
0.7 2.881    2.39803 2.59910 2.601 2.601 2.585 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of the cumulative effect of different taxes on social welfare 
 Type 
  Externalities Expected Prudent Imprudent Resilient 
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
 
0.1 -            
8.909  
              
1.375  
             
1.410  
            
1,111  
            
1.,206  
0.2 -          
13.851  
              
2.678  
             
2.903  
            
2.217  
            
2.308  
0.3 -          
18.072  
              
4.639  
             
5.041  
            
3.982  
            
2.720  
0.4 -          
22.142  
              
7.342  
             
7.890  
            
6.618  
            
4.538  
0.5 -          
26.116  
     10.594       11.194      10.003              
7.801  
0.6 -          
29.934  
     14.162       14.664      13.862            
12.011  
0.7 -          
33.528  
     17.836  18.093  17.900            
16.549  
Note: The first column compares with a world without externalities 
 
 
Regarding the weight of environmental taxes as a percentage of Px, whose transfer to the 
consumer income depends on the elasticity of X's demands, a regulation of externalities using 
prudent taxes would have a weight of close to 50% even for low contamination values, and 
even more, it increases almost duplicating Px in t=2 (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Taxes as a percentage of the price of the contaminating sector in t=1,2 
  Type  
  Expected Prudent Imprudent Resilient 
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
 
0.1 0.392 0.275 0.473 0.477 0.296 0.300 0.392 0.000 
0.2 0.470 0.450 0.556 0.565 0.362 0.372 0.470 0.661 
0.3 0.557 0.622 0.645 0.656 0.441 0.476 0.557 0.886 
0.4 0.653 0.747 0.737 0.747 0.534 0.554 0.653 0.937 
0.5 0.741 0.826 0.814 0.822 0.628 0.649 0.741 0.950 
0.6 0.812 0.875 0.871 0.876 0.710 0.729 0.812 0.949 
0.7 0.864 0.906 0.910 0.914 0.778 0.794 0.864 0.944 
 
 
When the study introduces PES, it conducts a comparison between them operating alone and 
what economy has reached with both the expected tax and the resilient tax (Graph 5). The 
idea is to determine which amount of PES makes them attain the same results in terms of 
decreasing the externality that affects N. For the different percentages of pollution, results 
indicate that the welfare obtained is similar to both scenarios. However, there is also a huge 
redistribution of profits of the sector who buys the environmental service for the sector who 
sells (X) it. Therefore, the sector that provides a Public Service would have no incentive to 
invest in PES. The situation will get worse when there would be several sectors affected by 
X's pollution because PES become a public good. So that PES can operate, policy makers 
would have to think that the firm that provides a public service had incentives different from 
private earnings as the protection of the natural capital at levels, which are much higher than 
when the sector maximizes their private economic profits. 
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Graph 5. Incidence of PES on N's capacity of resilience 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
One of the main characteristics of a natural system and its capacity to respond regarding 
degradation and pollution is resilience, and one of the problems in treating this characteristic 
is determining its level and capacity to respond when facing a disturbance. This study 
evaluated the complete transmission channel through a general two-period equilibrium model 
in a way that resilience affects the production of a public service and the economy in general, 
and at the same time the level of activity of a representative contaminating sector affects 
resilience. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of this affectation will depend on the natural 
system’s capacity to recover in time. In addition, this study assumes a continuous probability 
distribution that captures the fact that the probability of being in a more critical level increases 
as contaminating production increases assenting to the asymmetric uncertain characteristic 
of the natural system's response.  
 
This study also allows the analysis of the incidence of several taxes including imprudent, 
prudent, optimal and resilient. The first refers to a Pigovian Tax supposing a high level 
capacity of resilience. The second supposes very low resilience. The optimal equals the 
expected value of prudent and imprudent scenarios, and the resilient quantifies the 
cumulative damage that pollution in the first period produces in the amount of natural capital 
in the second period. Maintaining resilience capacity depends on the conjectures regarding 
the distribution of response to this resilience and the cumulative damage of pollution. 
Furthermore, the Pigouvian tax does not consider this cumulative damage.  
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Regulating the environment externalities using these taxes makes the prices of the 
contaminating sector increase extensively but the sector that provides a public service and 
social welfare also recover. If the model were to extend to several periods, adjustments would 
be gradual and would have less impact on the sectors. The main result is that with a prudent 
tax, society produces a greater amount of public service, and social welfare is higher in 
comparison with a resilient tax even if the differences in welfare between the two are very 
small.  
 
These results serve to give a response to studies like Pindyck (2013) who calculated in the 
context of a partial equilibrium model that willingness to pay to conserve Environmental 
Services, which climatic change could affect, has a lower amount than implementing a 
contamination reduction policy.  
 
Using PES generates a very significant redistribution of the profits of an economic sector 
buying the service for a polluting sector selling, so the sector that provides a public service 
in the model would have no incentives to invest in PES. The situation should worsen when 
the contaminating sector's pollution affects several sectors because PES becomes a public 
good. To have PES work, it would be necessary to think that the firm that provides a public 
service should have incentives different from private earnings as the protection of the natural 
system at higher levels than those resulting from maximizing their private economic profits. 
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Appendix. Determining Pigovian taxes in an optimal allocation model 
 
To reach the optimal allocation, the following problem is proposed: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥      𝑈 =  X𝑐
𝛼Y𝑐
𝜃N𝑐
1−𝛼−𝜃    𝑠. 𝑎.   (24) 
𝑋 =    𝐻 N𝑥
𝛿Y𝑥
𝜀
→  λ1 
𝑌 = 𝑀 N𝑦
𝛱X𝑦
𝜃
→  λ2 
𝑁 = 𝐴 Y𝑁
𝜓𝑓(ωX) →  λ3 
 X = X𝑐 + X𝑦 → μ1 
𝑌 = Y𝑐  + Y𝑥 + Y𝑁 →  μ2 
𝑁 = N𝑐 + N𝑥 + N𝑦 →  μ3 
 
The control variables are X𝑐 , Y𝑐, N𝑐 , Y𝑥, N𝑥 , X𝑦, N𝑦, Y𝑁 , 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑁, and the Lagrange function is 
given by: 
 
ℒ = X𝑐
𝛼Y𝑐
𝜃N𝑐
1−𝛼−𝜃 + λ1 (𝐻 N𝑥
𝛿Y𝑥
𝜀
− 𝑋) + λ2 (𝑀 N𝑦
𝛱X𝑦
𝜃
− 𝑌) + λ3(𝐴 Y𝑁
𝜓𝑓[𝜔𝑋] −
𝑁) − μ1(X𝑐 + X𝑦 − 𝑋) − μ2(Y𝑐 + Y𝑥 + Y𝑁 − 𝑌) − μ3(N𝑐 + N𝑥 + N𝑦 − 𝑁) 
 (25) 
 
Differentiating on Y𝑥, Y𝑁, 𝑋 and equaling to zero:  
 
𝑒 𝐻 N𝑥
𝑑Y𝑥
𝑒−1λ1 − μ2 = 0 
λ3𝜓 𝐴 Y𝑁
𝜓−1𝑓[𝜔 𝑋] − μ2 = 0 
−λ1 + μ1 + λ3 𝐴  Y𝑁
𝜓𝑓′[𝜔 𝑋]𝜔 = 0 
  
clearing the multipliers yields the sector X marginal equality:  
 
μ1
μ2
=
1
𝜕𝑋
𝜕Y𝑥
− [
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑁
𝜕 Y𝑁
]  𝜔   (26) 
 
For the market equilibrium to replicate this result, the tax must be such that: 
 
𝑡 = − [
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑁
𝜕 Y𝑁
] 𝑃𝑌, 𝑃𝑌 = 1 by applying Walras’ Law.  (27) 
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